

American Democracy and Military Service

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Current demands for changes in the Selective Service System are rooted in part in the strong public presumption that the draft operates with a definite bias against America's lower socio-economic groups. This claim has an important element of truth. But this image of social class bias is so oversimplified as to be an inadequate and even dangerous basis for public discussion of the draft.

The purpose of this article is to examine some of the social class and demographic factors involved in the impact of the Selective Service System and to propose an alternative system which I believe to be more compatible with the needs and goals of political democracy.

First of all, what are the origins of the presumption of bias in the draft? When selective service was re-instituted in the Korean conflict, it was only for a partial mobilization in contrast to the more total mobilization of World War II. There was a military need for only part of the young men between 19 and 26. There was also a desire not to disturb the flow of trained civilians into the professions and sciences. In addition, the Selective Service System did not want responsibility for determining who should go on to higher education. As a result, occupational and educational criteria were used as the basis for deferment.

In the public view, this unfairly placed the burden of military service on those who did not go to college—on the lower socio-economic groups. After the Korean war, a set of demographic factors contributed

to the validity of this perception. From the end of the Korean conflict until the period of the South Vietnam build-up, the available manpower in age groups eligible for selective service steadily *increased*, and the number who had to be drafted steadily *decreased*. The result was even greater reliance on occupational and educational deferments.

In order to piece together a fuller and more detailed picture of the social consequences of the draft, we must now turn to the efforts of a handful of social researchers. We must also add inferences drawn from the operational statistics of government agencies and special governmental surveys.

Poor Man's Burden

At the outset, it is of prime importance to make a distinction between the *recruitment patterns of selective service* and the *allocation of manpower within the armed services*. During the Korean hostilities, research has shown that the burdens of war, especially the incidence of casualties, fell disproportionately on lower socio-economic groups. This resulted as much from the way manpower was utilized by the ground forces as from the social bias of selective service.

Among non-commissioned officers and enlisted men in the ground forces where the bulk of Korean war casualties occurred, the heavier incidence of casualties was among lower socio-economic groups. The lowest income groups had four times the casualty rate of the highest group, while Negro casualties were pro-

portionately twice as numerous. The division of labor in the military establishment meant that young men with better education (and higher socio-economic position) were sent to advanced training and specialized units where casualty rates were lower. Infantry units, those units which in the language of the military require "soft skills," were staffed with men of limited educational preparation and reflected a lower class and rural background. At the officer level, because of the emphasis on college graduation as a requirement for officers, there was a bias in the reverse direction.

After the Korean conflict, selective service, while it had definite biases, operated with relative fairness, especially since there were no combat operations. The very few casualties occurred mainly in Air Force units engaged in routine aerial operations. These were officers of higher socio-economic background and reflected the exposure to risks that a professional officer corps has to take.

A national service program supplies a powerful weapon for preventing the creation of a predominantly Negro, or even all-Negro, enlisted force in the army—an 'internal foreign legion.'

The basic manpower requirements of the armed forces between conflicts were met by two sources: small quotas of young men were drafted and were assigned to the Army; the bulk of the requirements were met through volunteers who were responding in part to the pressure of the Selective Service System. This pressure not only generated men into the enlisted ranks but also into various short-term officer programs. The Air Force and the Navy, because of more attractive conditions of work and the specialized training they offered, could rely on volunteers exclusively. In fact, after the end of the Korean conflict, standards of recruitment were raised and kept out low income and Negro young men who wished to serve, but who were made ineligible because of educational requirements. The Marine Corps was also able to attract the personnel required because of its traditions and its image in American society. In addition, Marine Corps recruitment was aided by an initial enlistment of two years as opposed to the three-year term for the Army. Since Vietnam, however, the Marines have also drawn from Selective Service.

On the basis of available materials it is possible to describe the educational and social background of those who actually served in the armed forces during the period before the expansion of manpower for South Vietnam. At this point we are interested in the incidence of all types of military service—whether a man volunteered or was drafted, whether he was an officer or an enlisted man—for all these types of military service are influenced by the operation of the Selective Service System.

A good indicator is the military experience of men who were aged 27 to 34 in 1965—these men had already passed through the period of their eligibility for selective service. Of this group, those whose education ranged from completion of nine years of school to completion of college, roughly the same percentage (about 70 percent) in each group had served in the military. At the lower end of the education continuum the incidence of military service declines sharply: only one-third of those with less than grammar school education had served in the military. At the upper end of the continuum there was also a decline: of those who entered graduate and professional school, only one quarter entered active service.

The reasons are obviously different. Those with less than eight years of education were deferred on the basis of unfitness, a direct expression of their low education achievement and related medical and psychiatric disabilities. Graduate and professional study produced exemption on the basis of educational deferment, often supplemented by marital deferment. In effect, a young man's chances serving in the armed forces are decreased to the extent that he applies his energies to extending his education beyond four years of college. (This analysis does not include the limited number of agricultural deferments which tended to favor those with lower levels of education.)

Since education in the United States is unequally distributed, in order to understand the social risks of the military service, it is necessary to analyze these issues in terms of socio-economic categories, particularly in terms of the interplay of social class and race. The interplay of these two factors has meant that in the recent past the Negro is *under-represented* in the armed services. This can be seen in two different ways.

- Among men with less than eighth grade education, Negroes served to a lesser degree than whites. The same held true among those with nine to eleven grades of education. But among high school graduates Negroes and whites served in similar proportions.

- Among men of low socio-economic background, the difference in military service between Negroes and

whites is marked, while the difference in military service between Negroes and whites with middle class socio-economic background declines.

Reenlistment and Race

The overall participation of Negroes has risen from 8.2 percent in 1962 to 9.0 percent in 1965 and is most likely to continue to rise. This rise is related both to the *procurement rate* of new Negro personnel and more pointedly to the *reenlistment rates* of Negroes. During the period 1962 through 1965, Negroes both volunteers and inductees—were entering the armed services at about their proportion in the civilian society. Given the attractiveness of a military career to low income groups, this percentage still reflects the lack of educational preparation of Negroes. But the period 1962–1965 was one of an improvement in the quantity and quality of Negroes seeking admission to the armed services.

On the other hand, once there was an increase in selective service quotas in the latter part of 1965 because of South Vietnam, the procurement of Negroes by induction fell from 15.2 percent to 10.8 percent in December 1965. This shows that representative draft without college deferments would in the long run contribute to the elimination of any over-representation of Negro enlisted personnel, a point to be borne in mind for further discussion of this problem below.

However, more important in accounting for the representation of Negroes in the armed forces is the markedly higher *reenlistment* rate for Negro enlisted personnel. In 1965 the first term reenlistments of white personnel were 7.1 percent while for Negroes they were 45.1 percent. Given their educational backgrounds and previous levels of skills, Negroes have tended to concentrate in the combat arms of the Army where the opportunities are greatest for rapid advancement into non-commissioned officer positions. In some units such as the Airborne the percentage of Negroes is near 40. Overall participation of Negroes in Vietnam for the last part of 1965 showed the Army had the highest proportion with 15.8 percent, the Air Force 8.3 percent, the Marines 8.9 percent, and the Navy 5.1 percent. From 1961 to 1965 Negro fatalities were 237 out of 1,620 or 14.6 percent.

The armed services are aware of the dangers of creating units in which Negroes are concentrated. It is, of course, basic to the operations of the armed services not to use racial quotas; on the contrary, they look with pride on the success of integrating the Negro into combat units, for success in combat units is the basis of military prestige. The armed services have a variety

of personnel practices designed to distribute Negroes more equally throughout the services, but these are only slowly being implemented. Given the high rate of reenlistment among Negroes, it is not difficult to anticipate future trends.

Thus, in summary, it is clear that there have been distortions of the Selective Service System, mainly in the past, through the exclusion of low educational groups, especially Negroes, and contrariwise through exclusion of persons following post-college education. To some degree, exclusion at the lower levels will be modified as educational standards of the country rise and criteria for selection are altered. Efforts on the part of the armed services to deal with this question by having special remedial battalions have not received congressional support; but special civilian or military programs are certain to emerge in the years ahead not only because of the requirements of the military but because of broader social policy. Already the Secretary of Defense has lowered the entrance standards and thereby increased the input of low income groups into the armed forces. Between 40,000 and 100,000 "category four" men (percentiles 10–30 in mental tests) will be inducted because it is believed that the armed forces can efficiently train and utilize them. Alternatively, distortions due to post-college education seem to be growing as the emphasis on such education increases in the United States. In the current situation we are dealing not only with the facts of distortion but with the growing public conviction that educational deferments *per se* are morally undesirable.

Assessment of the past performance of the Selective Service System must encompass more than the social characteristics of those who entered military service. We must also look at its administrative effectiveness. The system has operated in the past with a considerable degree of effectiveness in meeting immediate and short term requirements. In fact, its basic concern with month-to-month procurement in part prevented the development of a longer range perspective and a capacity to meet changing requirements.

The organization represents an effective balance between highly centralized policy decision-making and decentralized implementation. The Selective Service System has worked with an amazing absence of personal corruption. To select young men for military service is a painful task, and the use of local community personnel has reduced hostility to rules and regulations. Moreover, there is a general feeling that local boards have been fair in applying national directives to local situations. Decentralized operating procedure has reduced local friction, but it produced consider-

able variation in practice from state to state, and these differences have become a new source of criticism.

Selective service and its local boards operate with local quotas, not on the basis of a national manpower pool which would take wide discrepancies in population characteristics among communities into consideration. Moreover, there are wide variations in quotas on a month-to-month basis. Another problem is that the Selective Service System has emerged more and more as a procurement agency for the Department of Defense without adequately representing the interests of the registrants in the larger society. While local boards are civilian, all other officials from national headquarters to state directors tend to be military in rank or orientation.

The Citizen Soldier

The Selective Service System as it operated after the Korean war was adapted to the realities of the American political system and to American strategic commitments during a period of international tension without actual military operations.

- First and most basically, it was seen as a temporary system. The resistance to a permanent Selective Service System has been pervasive in the United States, even after World War II.

- Second, it operated with a minimum of disruption of civilian society while at the same time requiring manpower for the type of armed forces the Executive wished to create. The new instruments of mass destruction require an increasingly professional force with a high concentration of intermediate and long-term career commitments. During much of the period between Korea and Vietnam the size of the ground forces was limited and a limited selective service was able to meet their requirements. Even during the period of gradual military expansion after 1960 the selective service operated without great social strain or disruption. In good part this was due to the career opportunities the military establishment offered to the socially disadvantaged.

- Third, a temporary Selective Service System coupled with an extensive reserve component helped keep alive the citizen-soldier concept which has strong roots in the American scene. More tacitly than explicitly, the Selective Service System is seen, and in fact does operate, as a force for civilianizing the armed services and overcoming the sharp segregation of the military from civilian society that characterized the armed forces before World War II.

The temporary nature of selective service operated to inhibit both long-range planning and public discus-

sion of its operations since there was a pervasive feeling that at some future date it would no longer be needed. In fact in 1964 President Johnson authorized a study to possibility of its ultimate elimination.

Instead, events in South Vietnam demonstrated the rigidities and inequalities of present procedure. During this period of actual military operations, the Selective Service System operates ineffectively and produces considerable social and political strain. Selection criteria have been lowered, but the armed services have not developed the kinds of remedial programs which operated during World War II to utilize manpower which civilian society has not adequately prepared for adult responsibility and service in the military establishment. Contrariwise, college deferments had to be altered to meet manpower requirements.

During the Korean war, the lowest income groups had four times the casualty rate of the highest income groups, while Negro casualties were proportionately twice as frequent as white casualties.

The Selective Service System, in order to develop criteria for utilizing college students on a partial basis, turned to the American Council on Education. In retrospect it is incredible that the American Council on Education did not engage in wider consultation with its constituency, but merely endorsed the repetition of a system that was used during the Korean hostilities. The changed political circumstances and heightened sensitivity to issues of social justice, as well as the arbitrary character of the system of deferments based on academic performance, have led to the current agitation.

Recommendations for change in the Selective Service System usually rest on an admixture of the above arguments based on moral justification, plus economic costs, military efficiency, and broad conceptions of the national interest in both domestic and foreign policy. Three basic positions of criticism contain some similar features, but express different conceptions of who shall serve in the armed forces of a political democracy.

- The armed forces should be a completely voluntary establishment based on a competitive pay scale, regardless of the costs. Immediate personnel shortages should be made up by some form of temporary lottery system to meet particular emergencies.

- The Selective Service System should be reformed. The current system is inefficient as well as morally unjust but to rely exclusively on a "mercenary" army is politically risky and disruptive and probably not economically feasible. Into the foreseeable future, some form of selective service is required to produce manpower for the military establishment. The current system should be reformed mainly by a lottery to augment those who volunteer to serve.

- There should be some form of national service in which most young men of draft age serve the country either in the armed forces or in other national programs. In this perspective effective education as well as the pressures of social and political change underscore the desirability of broad involvement of American young people for one or two years in various types of national service, both domestic and international. Selective service is required, but it must operate in a moral and political setting which makes it legitimate. To ensure military needs, selective service would rely on a lottery plus differential incentives. Those who do not serve in the military either as volunteers or selectees would be expected (or alternatively, required) to perform national service in a variety of programs, including non-governmental ones. In my own view, the alternative service should be voluntary, and I believe if properly administered it would succeed in involving the bulk of the youth who don't serve in the armed forces.

All three positions give a role to a lottery system if only as a temporary or stand-by device. Civilians who urge this change must recognize that the idea of a lottery system strikes at a sensitive theme in the military self-image. The professional soldier often believes that civilians perceive him as a man who has somehow failed in the occupational competition of the larger society. Many officers hold the view that a lottery for the selection of enlisted men would strengthen and substantiate this stereotype that military service is a job for losers, as members of a luckless legion. Further, the military believe that the motivation of the soldier selected by a lottery might contaminate the attitudes of regular personnel and thus weaken efficiency.

I believe a national service system to be the most desirable format as a long term alternative to the Selective Service System, even though it clearly could not be launched overnight. In the summer of 1966, Secretary McNamara delivered a speech on national service which served to focus attention on this topic. It produced widespread response, and the President's Commission on Selective Service is specifically charged with exploring the dimensions of national

service. In considering the logic of a national service system, two elements are of crucial importance:

- In my opinion the national service system supplies a sound basis for coping with the deficiencies of any draft system, including one that must rely on a lottery system. In other words, I have no objection to arguing that some form of national service would make the lottery, if it had to be used, more acceptable to all involved. The national service program would emphasize voluntarism plus positive incentives.

- More crucial is the argument that a national service program supplies a powerful weapon for preventing the creation of a predominantly or even all-Negro enlisted force in the army, an "internal foreign legion," which would be disastrous for American political democracy.

Supply and Demand

To anticipate military manpower requirements for even a year or two in advance has been hazardous in the past. However, to design an alternative to the current Selective Service System, it is necessary to make assumptions for a 10 to 20-year time period. While the military manpower aspects of a national service system could be introduced very rapidly, other elements of a national service system would have to be developed over a five-year period.

Chart I (below) shows that the number of new personnel procured by the armed forces in 1965 was over 570,000. This includes the small number in the special federal programs of the Coast Guard, US Public Health Service, and the Merchant Marine Academy. In 1966 with the South Vietnam build-up this figure went well over 800,000.

As a point of departure for planning a national service program, it is assumed that the required level of manpower will be equal to that before the current build-up. This implies a reduction of international tensions and in particular some degree of stabilization in Southeast Asia, without which even larger amounts of military manpower will be required. For the purposes of this analysis it is projected that all the various procurement programs for officers and enlisted men will need 550,000 to 600,000 men for each of the next 10 years and a slowly decreasing number during the tenth to the twentieth year.

Each year in the United States approximately 1,800,000 young men reach the age of 18. This figure can be expected to increase slowly in the years ahead before it declines. To many manpower specialists this presents a real dilemma. (See Chart II below.) We have too many young men to operate only with a selective

CHART I. New Military Manpower Actually Procured in 1965

National Military Establishment	
Enlisted: First Enlistments	318,209
Inductions	102,555
Reserves—Active Duty Training	94,374
TOTAL	515,138
Officers: Commissioned	46,535
Officer Candidates	
Academy Cadets (Entering Class)	2,449
Aviation Cadets and OCS	2,856
TOTAL	51,840
Coast Guard	
Officers	385
Enlisted: Regular Terms	4,912
Active Duty Training	3,038
TOTAL	8,335
U.S. Public Health Service	665
Merchant Marine Academy	200
TOTAL NEW PERSONNEL	576,178

(Includes special federal programs—Coast Guard, US Public Health Service, and Merchant Marine Academy)

service system, and on the other hand, military manpower requirements are too large to rely upon a voluntary system. Among other issues, a national service system is designed precisely to deal with this dilemma.

Alternatives to Arms

National service is based upon a dual concept. Military manpower needs must be met by a fair and flexible selective service system, recognizing that there will be hardships and imperfections in any system. At the same time all young men should engage in some type of national service. The notion of national service could apply to young women also, but for the purposes of this discussion it is given a second level of priority.

For those young men who do not enter military service, either as volunteers or under a reformed system of selective service, national service should be voluntary. There must be a maximum amount of free choice in the type of national service and a heavy emphasis on the role of private and voluntary groups in developing opportunities for national service. In short, the goal is to fuse a reasonable selective service system with a broad concept of national service. The basic features and principles are strikingly simple.

• First, each new group of 18-year-old men would be required to participate in a national registration at which each young man would make known his per-

sonal service preference. He would have the opportunity to indicate his choice of three basic alternatives:

—*Declare intention to volunteer for military service* and indicate interest in the various specialized procurement programs including enlistment in a reserve program with active duty training.

—*Declare himself subject to selective service* and indicate what type of alternative volunteer national service he prefers in the event he is not selected by lottery for military service.

—*Apply for exemption* on the basis of being a conscientious objector by virtue of religious conviction or other criteria set forth in the decisions of the US Supreme Court. There would be no marital exemptions and while there would be some family hardship and financial hardship exemptions, a federal allotment system would be used wherever required to eliminate gross inequalities. Deferment on the basis of critical skill (as defined by the Department of Labor) would be kept to a minimum, handled as under present arrangements, and administered by local selective service boards.

• Second, entrance into the military service takes place when the young man is 19, or in an orderly fashion on a basis of completing a given school year. Those who wish to volunteer for military service are directly incorporated on the basis of their preference and qualifications. Volunteers, of course, must be matched against the available openings. Military manpower requirements beyond those filled by voluntary choice would be met by the Selective Service System through a lottery. Normally, a young man would be subject to the selective service lottery only once in his life—at age 18. Such an approach would eliminate the great uncertainty which exists in the present system. It would be expected that young men who did not enter the armed forces would complete their alternative volunteer national service by the time they reach 26 years of age. Only in the event of a major national emer-

CHART II. Number of Males Attaining age 18 for Selected Years, July 1st

1966	1,791,000
1967	1,787,000
1968	1,775,000
1969	1,823,000
1970	1,871,000
1971	1,938,000
1972	1,974,000
1973	2,028,000

Source: Current Population Reports, November 30, 1965

gency would young men between the ages of 19 and 26 be liable for subsequent exposure to selective service procurement.

• Third, it is clearly recognized that there would be differential incentives and rewards. Those who served in the armed forces would receive a GI Bill of benefits, while alternative national service would not have such features, or very limited ones in the case of the Peace Corps. Alternative service might very well be longer than military service. The Peace Corps, for example, requires 27 months in contrast to 24 months of military service, reflecting an appropriate differential incentive and differential obligation. The type of alternative national service would depend on the skills and qualifications of the man involved as well as his preference. The time at which a person would complete his national service would be determined by his convenience and by the time he is best prepared to perform his national service.

This system does not imply that the armed forces will become the manager of large numbers of young men. To the contrary, the administration of selective service would rest in the present structure. Once military manpower needs are met, the armed forces would have no involvement with the rest of the age group. For example, young men might voluntarily enter the Peace Corps after they had been exposed to the lottery system. The same is true for all forms of alternative service described below.

The national service concept emphasizes maximum reliance on voluntary compliance along with the lottery which is designed to meet military manpower needs. But it is a system of voluntary service in a context of already changing social and political goal definitions. Expansion of the voluntary aspects would be based upon the creation of real and meaningful opportunities for fulfilling these goals, requiring both public and private funds of noteworthy magnitude.

The Logistics of National Service

The initial step in examining the logistics of national service is to recognize that the existing standards of eligibility for selective service—both medical and educational—are not relevant. In the past, of those young men who were subject to examination by selective service, 15 percent were rejected on medical grounds. If one adds those rejected by educational standards and on administrative grounds (moral and criminal records), rejections in some years rose to over 45 percent with the bulk turned down for educational deficiencies. Men who volunteered for military service had, of course, a much lower rate of rejection, so

a more realistic rejection rate on the basis of past military standards for 18-year-old youths would be approximately 30 percent. Thus under present arrangements the 1,800,000 young men of a given 18-year-old cohort would be allocated as follows: 600,000 enter military service; 600,000 are rejected; and 600,000 become surplus by various forms of exemptions and deferments.

A basic objective of national service is to eliminate arbitrary educational standards either through remedial efforts by the armed forces, or by substitute service in a National Job Training Corps. Thereby, many young men would have a second chance to enter the mainstream of American life. However, those with severe medical problems, gross bodily deformities, incapacitating psychiatric maladjustments, mental retardation, or asocial personalities would be rejected under any circumstances. There are, in addition, those young men who suffer from limited defects, especially medical ones, who would be better off not participating in any of the group experiences of national service. In all, about 15 percent of the 18-year-old group, approximately 270,000 persons, would be rejected—leaving a total manpower pool of roughly 1,530,000. In Chart III (below) allocations of manpower to the various programs of a national service system are set forth on the basis of this figure.

If force levels can be reduced to their size before the South Vietnam build-up, the armed forces will require approximately 575,000 new men each year. For the normal intake of enlisted personnel, both volunteer and selected by a lottery system, 500,000 will be required. Because of the impact of a lottery, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps will be able, as in the past, to meet their military manpower requirements on the basis of volunteer three-year enlistments. The Army will have to rely on a mixture of volunteers and those procured by the lottery system.

The majority of enlisted men, including volunteers, do not re-enlist. For example, in 1964 only 25 percent of all armed services regulars re-enlisted. The armed services, because of the realities of the market place, still tend to lag behind civilian pay, especially for trained technicians. Some improvement in re-enlistment rates might be expected, especially in second and subsequent re-enlistments, by improving the conditions of work. But a high rate of personnel turnover at the enlisted level still is to be expected, and is in fact desirable.

If the situation were otherwise, it might be a dangerous indication that the armed forces did not have flexible policies and were being burdened with per-

CHART III. Manpower Allocations Under Projected National Service Program

Total age group (19 years old)	1,800,000	
Not eligible for National Service (15 percent medical and administrative)	270,000	
Eligible annual manpower	1,530,000	
Projected Annual Allocations for National Service:		
National Military Establishment		
Enlisted Personnel	500,000	
Officer Personnel	75,000	575,000
Military Remedial Programs		40,000
Special Federal Programs (Substitute Service)		
U.S. Public Health Service, Coast Guard, Merchant Marine		10,000
Police Cadet Corps (Substitute Service)		100,000
National Teacher Corps		150,000
National Health Corps		50,000
Vista Workers and similar Public Programs		70,000
Private Domestic Programs		30,000
Peace Corps		50,000
Private Peace Corps Programs		20,000
National Job Training Corps		400,000
Conscientious Objectors		10,000
Not allocated		25,000
		1,530,000

(Does not include 90,000 enrolled in high school ROTC programs)

sonnel who could not find comparable positions in civilian life. Moreover, it should be recognized that the men who do not re-enlist bring back into the civilian sector crucial skills required for economic growth and personal mobility. This training proceeds with a high degree of effectiveness because of the organizational environment. Perhaps one of the most important changes would be to reduce the first term of voluntary enlistment in the ground forces to two years so it would be comparable with those procured under the draft. Specialized training would come wherever possible after the first period of two years of service.

An additional 40,000 young men would be taken on a volunteer basis into the Army for the proposed specialized training program designed to supply remedial education and health services. This would amount to only 10 percent of those eligible for such training—the remainder would be allocated to the National Job Training Corps.

To meet officer manpower needs, 75,000 men would have to enter the various procurement programs. This would include new entrants into the military academies and into the various college ROTC programs. This does not include the 90,000 students in the high school

ROTC since the bulk of these cadets would enter service as volunteers and become non-commissioned officers or, in a minority of cases, participate in an officer training program.

Special Federal Programs

In the United States there are various national programs which operate as substitutes for service in the armed forces. These include the Coast Guard, the Merchant Marine, and the Public Health Service. In all, approximately 10,000 men each year are involved. Entrance into these has been and should be considered substitute service for involvement in selective service. A police cadet corps could be established as another type of substitute service.

Police Cadet Corps. One hundred thousand young men could be given a substitute service in some form of police work. Increasing the number and quality of police officers is a pressing issue in the United States and bears a resemblance to the issues of military manpower procurement. Police departments require a broader base from which to recruit personnel, and professionalization would be enhanced by an increase in the flow of personnel in and out of the lower ranks. The opportunity for promotion of career police personnel would also be increased. Such service would exempt the person from selective service.

In addition, a number of federal programs could be established as part of the national service. Young men would have the opportunity to enlist after exposure to the lottery.

National Teachers Corps. One hundred fifty thousand teachers could be recruited annually for work in the inner city. Present policies and resources make it impossible for the inner city to have an adequate supply of teachers and teaching personnel. The whole trend in teaching is to make use of more personnel with general liberal arts background and special summer training. The Teachers Corps concept would also make use of semi-professionals with two years of college, and Teachers Aides with a high school background. Service in the national teaching corps would be an alternative for national service and would not exempt an individual from being subject to the lottery system.

National Health Corps. Similar to the National Teachers Corps, 50,000 young men could be utilized in the health service field.

Peace Corps. The present Peace Corps could be expanded to include 50,000 young men each year. The organizational procedures are well worked out and involve 27 months of service. Because of the small number involved, Peace Corps service could

be either substitute service that exempts individuals from the lottery or merely alternative volunteer service which the individual would perform if he was not selected by the lottery system. In addition, opportunities could be created for 20,000 men annually in private equivalents of Peace Corps operations abroad.

Domestic Vista Programs. Domestic equivalents of the Peace Corps under government sponsorship could employ 70,000. Private voluntary national service, under the auspices of church groups, voluntary associations and the like, would involve another 30,000 young men in the United States.

Conscientious Objectors. Conscientious objectors, in effect, constitute a very small proportion of the population, even if present Supreme Court definitions are used which include both political and religious opposition. At a maximum, 10,000 men per year would be involved under the broadest definitions.

National Job Training Corps. Of special importance in a national service program is a National Job Training Corps along the lines of the Civilian Conservation Corps which would annually accommodate up to 400,000 young men. The United States is witnessing a crisis in the ability of its educational institutions to meet the needs of low income groups. During the last three years we have witnessed an increase in social tension in the inner city to the point of outright explosion. It is unlikely that the schools can handle these problems. A National Job Training Corps under civilian jurisdiction, with clear paramilitary elements, would supply an opportunity for fundamental education and satisfactory interpersonal experience for achievement during the difficult years between dropping out or being forced out of school and being available for employment. In the past, the armed forces performed some of this job. But this becomes impossible as war becomes more automated and as the weapons of the military become more destructive. Service in a National Job Training Corps would be a substitute for military service; upon successful completion, the young man would be in a position to volunteer for the armed services.

For the next five to ten year period, the national service concept must be evaluated against a purely voluntary armed force based upon competitive economic compensation. From an economic point of view, an armed force based on "competitive" salaries is not a real possibility because of the imperfections of the market place. The military would always be disadvantaged relative to the private sector which could raise its prices and salaries at a more rapid rate. Each

official inquiry into these topics produces higher and higher cost estimates.

The counter argument to a purely volunteer force is not merely economic. It is also political and professional. An armed force reflects its recruitment. The effectiveness of the armed services is linked to its social composition and its ties to civilian society. In a communist society, professional standards and political control are maintained by a system of party control. It should not be overlooked that this system operates with a considerable degree of effectiveness, although it is incompatible with the standards of a democratic society. By contrast, the armed forces in a political democracy cannot operate without a variety of social links to civilian society. Executive and Congressional control at the top level is not sufficient. The military must find its place in larger society through a variety of contacts and points of interaction and control. A wide degree of representativeness of its personnel contributes to a willingness to accept the controls of the outer society. A long-term and highly professionalized force, especially at the enlisted man's level, is likely to be less representative and have weaker civilian ties.

But the case for national service is not to be based on a refutation of the volunteer force concept. The arguments for national service involve positive ideas of institution building and facilitating social change, although they fundamentally must deal with the task of selecting men for the armed forces.

- National service is an attempt of a democratic society to find an equitable approach to sharing the risks of military service without disrupting the management of its universities. The present system is unfair because of its reliance on educational deferments and inefficient because of the exclusion of those who do not meet contemporary standards. The present system is dangerous because of the disruptive impact on the administration of higher education. It has led students into post-graduate study as a basis of avoiding military service. Universities and colleges can best perform their educational functions if they are free from excessive involvement in the administration of selective service.

- The present system cannot long endure regardless of the projected size of the military establishment. The United States is faced with the prospect of a segregated Negro enlisted men's ground force if the present trends are permitted to continue. In fact, the strongest argument against a volunteer force is that such a procedure would merely hasten this transformation. A lottery system is an initial step toward the

control of this form of disequilibrium. A national service system would be another important step, for it would both make the lottery system more meaningful and help bring the Negro into the mainstream of American life. To the extent that Negroes become integrated into the larger society and have the same physical and educational qualifications as their white counterparts, concentration in particular sectors of the armed forces is likely to be reduced.

• National service is an experiment in education. National service is more than an effort at rehabilitation and a second chance for those youngsters who come from the most deprived segments of our society. It is designed to deal with fundamental problems of personal maturation for all social levels of contemporary society. The present structure of American education is unable to supply those group experiences required for the socialization of successive generations. The search for personal development and individual identity in a social setting which has a narrow emphasis on individual classroom performance leads all too often to various forms of rebellion and withdrawal.

Also, there is every reason to believe that the recent increased academic effectiveness of the American educational system, especially at the high school level, has been purchased at the price of complicating the process of personal development. In a democratic society it is particularly dangerous to make school and academic performance the exclusive route to mobility into adult society. The results of this danger are already clearly manifested by the existing levels of hostility, negativism, and apathy toward school.

National service is designed to make contributions to the educational objectives of all social strata. National service is designed to interrupt classroom experience at appropriate points, so as to give the young man alternative educational experiences. These experiences are designed to develop intense and close group solidarity, based on collective rather than individualistic goals.

• National service is an effort at "institutional building" to assist social change both at home and abroad. At home, it is an expression that traditional methods in educational and social welfare need drastic revision. We are dealing not only with the results of restrictive policies in the education and training of professionals, but with the inescapable fact that many operational tasks are better performed by persons who do not have trained incapacities. One way of organizing these work situations is to have persons perform them for short periods of time without having to confront the issue of a career in that particular vocation. Such experience is also vital preparation for more fully trained professional careers. The national service concept is designed particularly to meet this need, recognizing that there are limitations to the allocation of labor by economic incentives. Abroad, national service is part of the growing realization that United States foreign policy requires new approaches to produce economic, social, and political development. It is also a device for making service abroad part of the education and responsibility of each generation of highly trained professionals.

In the last analysis, national service is a form of enlightened self-interest on a world-wide basis.

SUGGESTED FURTHER READING

The Professional Soldier. Glencoe, The Free Press, 1960.
Sociology and the Military Establishment. New York,

Russell Sage Foundation. Revised Edition 1965, in collaboration with Roger Little.

The Military in the Political Development of New Nations. University of Chicago Press, 1964.

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